Twenty-nine distinct epizootics of high-pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) have occurred since 1959. The H5N1 HPAI panzootic affecting Asia, Africa and Eastern Europe has been the largest among these, affecting poultry and/or wild birds in 63 countries. A stamping-out programme achieved eradication in 24 of these epizootics (and is close to achieving eradication in the current H5N2 epizootic in South African ostriches), but vaccination was added to the control programmes in four epizootics when stamping out alone was not effective. During the 2002 to 2010 period, more than 113 billion doses of avian influenza (AI) vaccine were used in at-risk national poultry populations of over 131 billion birds. At two to three doses per bird for the 15 vaccinating countries, the average national vaccination coverage rate was 41.9% and the global AI vaccine coverage rate was 10.9% for all poultry. The highest national coverage rate was nearly 100% for poultry in Hong Kong and the lowest national coverage was less than 0.01% for poultry in Israel and the Netherlands. Inactivated AI vaccines accounted for 95.5% and live recombinant virus vaccines for 4.5% of the vaccines used. Most of these vaccines were used in the H5N1 HPAI panzootic, with more than 99% employed in the People's Republic of China, Egypt, Indonesia and Vietnam.
Introduction
High-pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) and lowpathogenicity notifiable avian influenza (LPNAI) in poultry are reportable to the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) by its 178 Member Countries (56) . The causal agents of LPNAI are limited to the H5 and H7 haemagglutinin subtypes of low-pathogenicity avian influenza (LPAI) viruses. Reporting HPAI and LPNAI outbreaks is necessary for animal health transparency (to minimise the risk of international disease spread), for fair trade and for the enhancement of our knowledge of the worldwide avian influenza (AI) outbreak situation in animals, which enables the development of effective, common control strategies. Traditionally, HPAI control strategies have used various components, including rapid diagnostics and accurate surveillance, elimination of infected flocks, enhanced biosecurity, and education/training of poultry workers (50) . Such combinations of components have been effective in eradicating most outbreaks when implemented to a high level, especially within stamping-out or culling programmes.
Since 1959, there have been 29 HPAI epizootics (45, 59) . Twenty-four have been handled with stamping-out strategies without vaccination, which has resulted in eradication. However, the largest HPAI epizootic or, more appropriately, panzootic of the last 50 years has been the H5N1 HPAI that emerged in the People' s Republic of China (hereafter referred to as China), first reported in 1996, and has since spread to poultry and wild birds in 63 countries or regions (16, 60) . In many of these countries, the H5N1 HPAI poultry outbreaks have been eradicated through traditional stamping-out programmes but, in some countries, stamping out alone has not achieved infection control or eradication. Thus, vaccination has been added as an additional control component to maintain rural livelihoods and reduce the number of clinical outbreaks. (47) . Thus, H5 and H7 LPAI viruses were unique and needed special status for surveillance, control and eradication in poultry, as compared to non-H5/H7 LPAI viruses, hence their reclassification as LPNAI viruses.
Vaccination has been used as a tool to control and eradicate multiple subtypes of LPAI in poultry since the late 1970s, with the licensing and use of oil-emulsified inactivated AI vaccines (48) . Most recently, vaccines have been used against H5 and H7 LPNAI in the USA, Italy, Mexico, Guatemala and El Salvador, with and without controlled slaughter (3, 48, 53) . The latter three countries have used both oil-emulsified inactivated AI vaccines and recombinant fowl poxvirus-vectored vaccine with an H5 AI gene insert. For HPAI, the first field uses of poultry vaccination were in Mexico against H5N2 HPAI (1995) (53) and Pakistan against H7N3 (1995) (35) . Vaccination for H5N1 HPAI was first implemented during 2002 in Hong Kong and soon thereafter in Indonesia and China (2004) (48) . Poultry vaccination programmes against H5N1 HPAI have been reported in Russia, Egypt, the Netherlands, France, Vietnam and Pakistan (48) . The current study examines the control components used in HPAI and LPNAI outbreaks from 2002 to 2010 and in current emergency plans, primarily focusing on vaccines and vaccination as a single tool in a comprehensive AI control strategy.
Materials and methods

Questionnaire on avian influenza vaccines and vaccination
A questionnaire survey was conducted, using the official channel of communication between the OIE and its Delegates, in the 80 countries that had reported HPAI and/or LPNAI outbreaks in poultry or wild birds between 2002 and 2010. The objective was to determine what lessons countries have learned from their past experiences in AI control and how they have modified ongoing AI control strategies to improve control and eradication.
The questionnaire was in two formats. A shorter format of 20 questions was sent to 42 countries, focusing principally on overall AI control strategies, with a few questions on AI vaccines and vaccination. A longer format, consisting of the initial 20 questions, plus an additional 17 that focused on how AI vaccines had been used, was sent to 38 countries that had or potentially had used H5 and/or H7 AI vaccines, based on information contained in the OIE World Animal Health Information Database (WAHID), published reports or field intelligence information. This longer-format questionnaire covered various topics, namely: general AI vaccine use policy, AI vaccine bank questions, vaccine usage, vaccination strategy, including exit strategy, and vaccine licensing. The questionnaire was available in English and French versions. The latter was sent to Francophone countries in Europe and Africa. The English version of the questionnaire is available as an appendix at the end of this paper. The responses for each question were grouped and compiled in a database (Access, Microsoft, Seattle, Washington, USA) and for numerical data analysis (Excel, Microsoft, Seattle, Washington, USA). The responses were analysed and interpreted.
Other data sets
The national poultry population data were obtained from one of three sources, in order of preference: i) the OIE WAHID Interface, Animal Population (59) ii) staff of the Veterinary Services of individual countries iii) the statistical database of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAOSTAT) (15).
From FAOSTAT, national poultry production was calculated by summing the figures of poultry slaughtered for meat (chickens, ducks, geese, guinea fowl, turkeys and others) and poultry for egg production (chickens and others). National poultry density was based on information about stocks of poultry and agricultural land, as obtained from FAO (http://kids.fao.org/glipha/). Poultry data were collected from the WAHID database for HPAI and LPNAI outbreaks and the species of birds affected (59) .
Avian influenza vaccine coverage (%) was calculated for selected poultry species in selected countries, based on the data available on doses of vaccine administered (from the current survey), vaccination protocol and poultry production data, generated as above (15). The percentage of coverage was calculated using an estimated average of two doses of vaccine per bird per year if poultry species were not specified or the country did not specify the vaccination programme. If vaccination was conducted only in layers or breeders, three doses were used for annual use calculations.
For selected countries with vaccine usage, Chief Veterinary Officers and their staff, and field veterinarians were interviewed and secondary information was collected to supplement the original questionnaire.
Results and discussion
All countries (short and long questionnaires)
General avian influenza control strategies and components A total of 69 out of 80 (86%) countries completed and returned the questionnaire. Responses were received from countries on all six inhabited continents: -Asia (24 countries) -Africa (10 countries) -North America (5 countries) -South America (1 country) -Europe (28 countries) -Australia and Oceania (1 country).
Of these 69 countries, 27 (39%) had experienced HPAI outbreaks in poultry only, 11 (16%) experienced HPAI outbreaks in wild birds only and 26 (38%) had HPAI outbreaks in both poultry and wild birds. Five (7%) countries had LPNAI outbreaks only while 14 (20%) had both HPAI and LPNAI outbreaks in poultry. Not all of the 69 responding countries completed every question in the survey.
For all countries, a national AI control programme was in place. The most frequently mentioned components in the plans included: -quarantine and additional movement restrictions or controls -tracing poultry in the outbreak area -enhanced biosecurity measures -farmer and public education and awareness about the disease -active and passive surveillance of poultry and wild birds -monitoring -rapid diagnostics -culling (stamping out) of positive cases -disinfection of facilities and equipment -decontamination and disposal of infectious materials -compensation.
Some countries also listed a crisis management framework, high-throughput rapid diagnostic testing, early processing of at-risk non-infected poultry, emergency vaccination and, occasionally, pen-side testing as a screening tool. The criteria for deciding which group of poultry should be culled varied greatly between individual countries (59) . For some countries, culling was only practised on infected premises, while other countries also culled dangerous contacts, epidemiologically linked farms or all poultry in a village. Some used a zone approach to culling, covering 0.5, 1 or 3 km in radius. Risk zones were also implemented in some countries, which incorporated varying levels of movement restriction and surveillance.
For HPAI, culling poultry in flocks, farms and villages was consistently used as a method for eliminating infected poultry or those suspected to be infected. For LPNAI, culling and disposal were most frequently used, but some alternatives were practised, including:
-slaughter of unknown/undiagnosed infected commercial poultry without recall of products; timedelayed marketing or controlled slaughter of commercial infected poultry to allow recovery from acute LPNAI virus infections -quarantine of recovered layer farms with marketing of washed eggs -release of quarantined egg layer flocks if demonstration of LPNAI virus was negative (59) (data from current survey).
Two developing countries allowed slaughter of clinically normal village poultry and/or commercial poultry that were infected with LPNAI (data from current survey) (59) . Seropositive flocks without recovery of the virus or detection of the viral genome have a low risk of disseminating the virus if specific management and biosecurity procedures are used (25) . Payment for destruction of such flocks by national governments through compensation programmes is fair to the farmer and causes the lowest risk to animal health, but requires a large outlay of financial and physical resources. However, if compensation is not available, marketing virus-negative flocks that have recovered from LPNAI is of low risk for disease spread to other flocks and to public health, if adequate biosecurity processes are used.
Compensation programmes were present in 48 of 69 (70%) countries and were linked to stamping out of infected flocks. The funding was provided by the government in 41 countries (85%) and via a government/industry partnership in six countries (13%). One country (2%) did not specify a funding source.
Vaccines and vaccination were included as an option for 58% and 39% of the countries in their HPAI and H5/H7 LPNAI control strategies, respectively, with 58% of the countries having written plans with specific criteria for vaccine usage. However, only 14% had actually completed AI vaccine and vaccination simulation exercises or worked out the logistics of implementing a vaccination programme. Table- However, the specific control components were only listed qualitatively as traits, and no assessment was included of the quantitative implementation and practice of each component in the comment section of the questionnaire. In the WAHID database on H5N1 HPAI outbreaks (59), the components listed in control measures were very similar between different countries, but the outcomes varied dramatically: some countries declared the disease to have been eradicated three months after the last flock had been stamped out and the premises disinfected (with the lack of infection attested by proper surveillance [55] ), but other countries reported that enzootic infection had Rev. sci. tech. Off. int. Epiz., 30 (3) 842 become established. Such outcome variations suggest that qualitative implementation of specific components, along with epidemiological, environmental and geographical factors, varied with individual countries, resulting in inconsistency in stopping the spread of the AI virus. This had a severe impact upon the total number of cases and outbreaks and, ultimately, the time it took to control and eradicate the disease.
A companion study indicated that the strength of the country' s Veterinary Services, as measured by the scores achieved in an OIE Evaluation of Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS), had an impact on HPAI control; i.e. higher PVS scores were associated with a decreased AI eradication time, mortality rate, culling rate and occurrence of outbreaks (39) . In addition, countries that were Members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) had fewer HPAI outbreaks, shorter outbreaks, earlier eradication times, lower poultry mortality rates and higher poultry culling rates than non-OECD countries (39) . This indicates that countries that are transparent, and provide adequate funding for the development and maintenance of efficiently performing Veterinary Services, have better control of HPAI.
Avian influenza vaccine and vaccination from 2002 to 2010
Field trials had been conducted with H5 vaccines in 25% and H7 vaccines in 7% of the countries before the implementation of field vaccination programmes or their inclusion in emergency response plans. In field implementation of vaccination, 30% of countries had used vaccines for HPAI control: 16% in poultry, 10% in zoological and other collections of birds and 4% in both categories. By contrast, 12% had used vaccines to control H5/H7 LPNAI and 17% to control non-H5/H7 LPAI but, in both of these virus categories, the vaccine was only used in poultry. For non-H5/H7 LPAI, H9N2 was the most common subtype for which vaccine was used as a control tool, and was reported by ten countries. Vaccine was also used, although to a lesser extent and in a restricted/targeted population or geographic region, against other LPAI subtypes in poultry. They included subtypes causing swine influenza in Canada (H3) and the USA (H1 and H3) in breeder turkeys; H6 in Germany, South Africa (ostrich breeders only) and the USA; and H2, H4 and H10 in the USA. In the USA, the vaccines were mostly used in turkeys, especially turkey breeder hens.
Avian influenza vaccine bank
Vaccination against AI can be used as a preventive, emergency or routine practice in control programmes for HPAI and LPNAI (30) . Vaccine banks are a necessary part of any emergency vaccination plan when other disease control measures alone are insufficient to contain the outbreak. In addition, implementation of an effective emergency vaccination programme also requires fully developed application plans and an understanding of the logistics of a vaccination campaign in the field. Preventive vaccination programmes may take a slightly longer time to implement than emergency vaccination programmes but are most effective when kept small in size and targeted to high-value or high-risk populations, such as genetic stocks of commercial poultry, zoo birds, rare birds or endangered species. Preventive vaccination programmes require less planning in advance than emergency vaccination programmes, but a vaccine bank and some logistical infrastructure may be necessary for rapid implementation, should an outbreak occur in the border area of a neighbouring country. If the HPAI or LPNAI becomes widespread and enzootic, routine vaccination may assist in reducing disease incidence and allow the continuation of poultry production in rural settings, to maintain the livelihoods and food security of the rural poor. A routine vaccination programme requires a steady, direct supply of commercial vaccine and cannot rely upon an emergency AI vaccine bank. In the survey, 13 countries (19%) reported development of an H5 and/or H7 national AI vaccine bank containing frozen virus (4 of 13), processed antigen (1 of 13) and/or final oil-emulsified product (10 of 13). The vaccines or pre-vaccine products were held by governments (8 of 13), private companies (2 of 13) or both (3 of 13). The seed strains used in the inactivated oil-emulsified vaccines included: -H5 and H7 LPNAI viruses from previous outbreaks in poultry (H5N2, H5N7, H5N9, H7N2 and H7N3) -an H5N1 HPAI virus -an H5N1 classic reassortant LPAI virus with the haemagglutinin gene from an H5 wild waterfowl virus -reverse-genetic-generated LPAI viruses (two H5N1 viruses and an H5N3 virus).
Ten countries had only H5 in the vaccine bank while three countries had both H5 and H7 vaccines in the bank. The quantity of vaccine ranged from 0.5 to 55 million doses per subtype, but most countries had ≤3.5 million doses of each subtype. Such modest quantities would limit emergency vaccination programmes to zoo birds, endangered bird species and valuable genetic collections of poultry, or targeted vaccination to high-risk poultry groups within a small geographic region. Such a small number of doses would not support a massive or routine vaccination campaign. Many of the first doses in the banks were acquired in 2006 (n = 4), when the risk of introducing the H5N1 HPAI virus from infected migratory wild birds was perceived as high in Europe and western Asia (42) . Some countries acquired vaccines for their banks during 2007 (n = 1), 2008 (n = 1), 2009 (n =1) and 2010 (n = 3). The vaccines' expiration dates ranged from one to four years. A few countries indicated that future vaccines would be purchased as rotating stocks from commercial vaccine manufacturers, but most countries did not have plans to purchase replacement vaccines for their bank. Some countries have opted out of vaccine banks, perceiving the cost of replacing and maintaining a vaccine bank to be unsustainable when the perceived risks of introduction from migratory birds have declined and significant improvements have been made in biosecurity for poultry production systems, as well as in rapid diagnostics and surveillance programmes.
The cost of vaccines and vaccination is mainly covered by federal and/or state or provincial governments but, in some countries, the commercial sector has responsibility for vaccine and vaccination costs within private companies. For emergency vaccination in the European Union (EU), 50% of the cost of vaccination is covered by the EU and 100% of the vaccine cost. iii) the high cost of vaccines and their labour-intensive administration, especially when individually injecting birds using inactivated vaccines iv) the delay in protection for seven to 14 days after administration v) trade restrictions imposed by importing countries (Table I) . 
Vaccination results in increased laxity in biosecurity 2%
Vaccination is less efficient than depopulation 2%
Avian influenza outbreak only in low-density poultry production area 2%
By contrast, 45 countries would consider using AI vaccines in the future or had used AI vaccines in the past. Their most consistent reasons for doing so included:
-the inability to control or eradicate an HPAI or LPNAI outbreak using stamping out and other control measures -a large outbreak with a high risk of spread -positive aspects of the vaccine, such as:
i) decreasing the susceptibility of poultry to infection ii) decreasing virus shedding iii) preventing clinical disease and mortality in birds (Table II) .
Long questionnaire only
General vaccine usage
The survey indicated that countries have used H5/H7 AI vaccines in the past eight years (2002-2010) in emergency, preventive and routine vaccination programmes (Tables III  to VII ). The majority of the countries used AI vaccines in an emergency programme after an outbreak of AI had occurred within the country (80%). Less frequently, some countries used vaccine in a preventive programme before AI had entered their borders (42%), or as routine vaccination after AI became enzootic in their country' s poultry population (36%). Countries have vaccinated and/or were vaccinating different types of birds to control or eradicate AI. Most frequently, it was chickens (meat chickens, broiler breeders, egg chickens and layer breeders), ducks (meat ducks and breeder ducks) and turkeys (meat turkeys and turkey breeders) that were vaccinated. However, other poultry species, including meat geese, breeder geese, quail, guinea fowl, pheasants, peacocks, grouse and ostriches, have all been vaccinated. In addition, zoo, hunting, companion, conservation and endangered birds received a minimal quantity of AI vaccine (Table V) . The doses used per year, vaccination coverage rates, national poultry populations, and national poultry densities are summarised in Tables III, IV and V for HPAI and in Tables VI and VII for LPNAI.
When it is stated that a country has a vaccination programme for poultry, the general public and public health officials may incorrectly assume that 100% of the poultry within the country have been vaccinated. However, the availability of vaccine and logistics of vaccination dictate how close a country can come to 100% coverage. In addition, many countries do not need mass vaccination campaigns and can target only high-risk poultry for vaccination. The FAO has classified poultry production into four systems, often called sectors. For this study, the authors used the FAO classification system: -sector 1: high biosecurity, industrial, vertically integrated production -sector 2: moderate-to-high biosecurity, commercial poultry, non-vertically integrated production, using both slaughterhouses and live markets Table II Responses of 45 countries concerning the conditions under which they would consider using or had already used avian influenza vaccines to control high-pathogenicity avian influenza or low-pathogenicity notifiable avian influenza
Reasons for using vaccines in avian influenza control Responses
Stamping out and other measures not adequate for control 29%
Widespread outbreaks 24%
High risk of spread 13%
To protect valuable birds, such as poultry breeders or endangered bird species 9%
To decrease animal susceptibility through improved immunity 7%
Enzootic disease 7%
To reduce virus shedding and infection pressure 4%
To decrease clinical infections and mortality 4%
In high-risk areas because of neighbouring infections 4%
As low-level support for stamping out by industry or citizens 4%
To control localised infection 2%
Persistence of avian influenza in a population of one species 2% To prevent low-pathogenicity avian influenza virus from mutating into a high-pathogenicity avian influenza virus 2%
To decrease economic losses 2%
For a geographic 'immunity ring' to prevent spread 2% Presence of adequate resources for vaccination programme 2%
Animal welfare concerns 2% -sector 3: minimal-to-low biosecurity, smallholder, commercial, including waterfowl, and sold mainly through live markets -sector 4: low-to-minimal biosecurity, mainly village and backyard production.
Against high-risk zoonotic avian influenza viruses 2%
The ease with which a national poultry population can be vaccinated depends on the number of premises and the size of the population. The survey indicated that the more poultry in sectors 1 and 2, the higher the coverage rate, because there are fewer farms to organise for vaccination and, since all aspects of production are integrated, cooperation between management and the farmer is easier. By comparison, if there are more poultry within sectors 3 and 4, which have more premises and independent management systems, there tends to be a lower coverage rate. With both LPNAI and HPAI, most of the world' s AI vaccine use occurs in developing and transition countries.
High-pathogenicity avian influenza vaccine use
Chickens, ducks, geese, turkeys and other poultry
Vaccination was first used against HPAI in Mexico during 1995, when 383 million doses of inactivated oil-emulsified vaccine, made from a 1994 precursor H5N2 LPNAI virus, were used (53) . The combined use of the vaccine and other control measures were associated with the eradication of the H5N2 HPAI virus by mid-1995 and Mexico's declaration of freedom from HPAI in December 1995 (53) . However, the predecessor H5N2 LPNAI virus has continued to circulate in central Mexico, resulting in the continued use of vaccines in the H5N2 LPNAI control programme (Table VI) . (Table III) . The years 2002 to 2005 were growth years for vaccine use, as AI vaccine-manufacturing capacity and inventories increased to meet demand, and vaccination logistics were developed to implement programmes in the field, especially in China (Table III) (Fig. 2) . The yearly use of vaccine was at its highest from 2006 to 2009, at over 26 billion doses per year, when all 15 countries had fully implemented vaccine programmes (Fig. 2) . The top four users of AI vaccine were China (90.99%), Egypt (4.65%), Indonesia (2.32%) and Vietnam The majority of vaccine (>99.5%) was used in the ten countries with a high (≥750 birds/km 2 ) to very high (≥7,500 birds/km 2 ) national poultry density, while less than 0.5% was used in the five countries with a moderate (<750 birds/km 2 ) to low (<75 birds/km 2 ) national poultry density.
Five countries/regions had routine AI vaccination programmes: China, Egypt, Hong Kong, Indonesia and Vietnam (Table III) . These countries had high to very high national poultry densities (963; 3,650; 136,804; 2,530 and 2,186 birds/km 2 , respectively) and low to very high national poultry populations (14.6-16.4 billion, 534-599 million, 3.5-11.7 million, 1.3-1.4 billion and 323-534 million birds, respectively).
Hong Kong had the highest vaccination coverage rate at more than 90.8%, after full implementation of its vaccination programme in 2004, but the numbers of poultry involved were quite small: 3.5 to 11.7 million per year, when compared to the production figures of other countries in Table III , excluding Mongolia. The calculated coverage rate exceeded 100% for four years because of variations in chick placements, the number of chicks sold on multi-age farms for long rearing periods with normal chick mortality and culling during grow-out, and wastage of vaccine in large dose bottles. Poultry in Hong Kong were raised by the small commercial systems of sector 3. Currently, only 30 registered farms are allowed to produce chickens for the live poultry market, with tight government control of the process. Hong Kong lacks the big commercial poultry systems of sectors 1 and 2, as well as the village or household poultry of sector 4. It is the only country/region whose mass vaccination policy approached 100% implementation in the field. In addition to vaccinated locally grown birds, vaccinated commercial live poultry were imported daily into Hong Kong from mainland China through a single wholesale market.
In the four countries that accounted for over 99% of vaccination use (China, Egypt, Indonesia and Vietnam) the peak vaccination coverage rate was 83.3% (Egypt in 2008) and the lowest rate was 11.1% (Indonesia in 2009) ( Table III) . Most of the production in all four of these countries takes place in sector 3 (small commercial farms) and sector 4 (village or backyard poultry), and both sectors have inherent logistical problems in applying any type of vaccine to such a large number of premises/households with low numbers of birds per premises. For example, surveys of vaccination coverage rates, based on H5 haemagglutination inhibition (HI) antibodies, showed vaccination rates of between 20% and 40% in sector 4 in Indonesia (33) , and less than 20% in sector 4 in Egypt (21) . By contrast, sectors 1 and 2 have a much higher vaccination compliance rate because fewer farms are involved, the owners are better educated on animal health issues and these sectors have the funds to implement economically oriented vaccination programmes, including hiring professional vaccination crews.
Interestingly, estimates of poultry production in developing countries vary significantly, especially for poultry produced on small farms (sector 3) and in the village/backyard (sector 4). For example, in Egypt, the vaccine coverage rates were based on a conservative 550 million poultry per year from FAOSTAT (15), but one domestic source (21) estimated poultry production of between 800 million and 1.4 billion birds per year, which suggests the average coverage rate would be much lower than the authors calculated; i.e. between 27.8% and 48.6%, instead of the 69.9% reported in The reason for such discrepancies is not clear, but the numbers used in this study were based on the questionnaire from the OIE Delegate in China and were reported in ml for inactivated vaccine, which had to be converted into doses, based on the volume for a dose in each species, and the percentage of the species in the poultry population.
Some countries used a targeted AI vaccination approach in their emergency control programmes; Pakistan, for example, which has a high national poultry population (435 to 717 million/year) and a high national poultry density (835 birds/km 2 ), conducted ring vaccination around outbreaks, resulting in vaccination of 0.7% to 1.0% of poultry per year. Similarly, Russia, with a high national poultry population (373 to 543 million/year) and a moderate national poultry density (168 birds/km 2 ), targeted its vaccination at village (sector 4) and small commercial flocks (sector 3), primarily in Siberia and eastern Russia, resulting in vaccination coverage rates of between 5.5% and 14.4% of poultry per year (Table III) (Table IV) , the highest AI vaccine coverage rate was achieved in meat (78.2%) and layer (31.6%) chickens, while meat ducks had 15%, turkeys 10.4% and other poultry had less than 1.4% coverage rates (Table IV) . By contrast, Pakistan has mainly focused its vaccination programme on long-lived poultry, i.e. breeders and layers (35) . The highest AI vaccine coverage rate was in broiler and layer breeders (25.8%). There was low coverage (2.8%) among layers and no AI vaccine use at all among broilers (Table IV) . Finally, Vietnam had higher AI vaccine 
Zoo, hunting, companion, conservation and endangered birds
No AI vaccines have been specifically licensed for zoo, hunting, companion, conservation or endangered species of birds, but H5 and H7 AI vaccines licensed for chickens are available and have been used in AI preventive vaccination programmes for non-poultry species. Such poultry AI vaccines were safe, producing only minor swellings at the injection sites of a few birds (41) . However, the stress of catching and handling the birds for vaccination and blood sampling resulted in low mortality rates in some species (13) .
From 2002 to 2010, a total of 20 countries used 271,690 doses of H5 or H7 AI vaccine in zoo, hunting, companion, conservation and endangered species of birds on over 292 premises (Table V) , representing 0.000003% of the total number of AI vaccine doses used in birds (Table III) . The largest vaccination programme of zoo and bird collections occurred in the EU. Seventeen countries were approved by the European Commission for preventive vaccination programmes against H5N1 HPAI among birds held in zoos and by other approved bodies, institutes and centres of Member States (13, 14) . (13) . Fifty percent of the birds seroconverted after a single vaccination and 82% after the second vaccination, as determined by HI titres ≥16 (13). Sero conversion rates varied with the species, family and order of birds, as well as the individual study country, but, in general, a booster vaccination significantly increased the serological titres, based on the HI test. Although challenge testing was not undertaken, the HI titres suggested protection rates of 71% (27) , 80% (40), 82% (41), 84% (2, 38), 94% (37) and 96% to 100% (19) after a two-dose regime, depending on the species and assuming an HI protective titre of ≥16, ≥32 or ≥40. Birds from the orders Anseriformes, Ciconiformes, Falconiformes, Galliformes, Phoenicopteriformes and Psittaciformes had seroconversion rates of ≥82% after one immunisation (13) . However, typically six months after vaccination, titres began to decrease, suggesting the need for an annual booster (13, 19) . In addition to the EU programme, vaccination of zoo or captive-held nonpoultry birds was conducted in Egypt and Israel (data from current survey), Hong Kong (current survey), Kuwait (current survey), Singapore (38), Switzerland ( [19] , current survey), and the United Arab Emirates (37) . Furthermore, H7 vaccination programmes were used in zoos in Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands, after the 2003 H7N7 HPAI outbreaks in poultry (13) .
In most zoos, an AI vaccination programme against H5N1 was not implemented as the principal method of protection from HPAI. The first line of defence was based on biosecurity measures (such as indoor housing, sanitation and hygiene programmes, the addition of netting to separate bird collections housed outdoors from wild birds, and isolation and quarantine facilities), veterinary care to ensure early detection of disease and screening birds before their entry into the collections (13). (Table III) .
Kazakhstan and Mongolia conducted preventive vaccination programmes in poultry in response to H5N1 infections and deaths in wild birds in both countries. Mongolia' s AI vaccination programme was implemented in 2005 and is scheduled to be discontinued in 2011, while Kazakhstan used vaccine throughout 2011 (Table III) However, the full vaccination programme was not immediately implemented because of lack of vaccinemanufacturing facilities within Egypt and logistics delays in importing sufficient vaccine doses (18) . Over 573 outbreaks occurred within the first five weeks after the first official reported outbreak. During those weeks, less than 1% of the poultry population had been vaccinated (7, 18) . In Indonesia, the first cases occurred in 
Low-pathogenicity avian influenza vaccine usage
Between 2002 and 2010, the total number of vaccine doses used in poultry against H5 and H7 LPNAI was much smaller (10.1 billion, 8.1%) than that used for HPAI (>113 billion, 91.9%) (Tables III & VI) . Vaccine was used in six countries with average national poultry densities ranging from 536 to 1,273 birds/km 2 ( Table VI) . The majority of vaccines used were oil-emulsified inactivated vaccines (5.76 billion doses, 57%), but a large amount of rFPV with an H5 haemagglutinin gene insert was also used (4.35 billion doses, 43%).
The top user was Mexico (82.28%), which has continued H5N2 vaccine use in broilers, broiler breeders, layers and layer breeders to control H5N1 LPNAI after eliminating H5N2 HPAI in 1995 (Table VI) . In addition, H5N2 vaccine was used in El Salvador and Guatemala after H5N2 LPNAI outbreaks began there in 2001 and 2000, respectively, making them the third-(1.95%) and second-(6.33%) highest users of vaccine against LPNAI, respectively (45). All three countries used inactivated H5N2 vaccine, made from a 1994 H5N2 LPNAI field virus from an early Mexican H5N1 LPNAI outbreak. Since 1998, Mexico has used an rFPV vaccine with a haemagglutinin gene insert from A/turkey/Ireland/83 (H5N8).
The fourth-highest user of vaccine against LPNAI was Italy, which has a high national poultry density (856 birds/km 2 ) ( Table VI) (Table VI) . The vaccination programmes were targeted in two ways:
-geographically, at northern Italy -at the most susceptible poultry species, primarily meat turkeys and some layers, along with vaccination of minimal numbers of cockerels and capons (32) .
Previous studies have demonstrated that turkeys are more susceptible than chickens to the H7N2 LPNAI virus, which caused outbreaks in Virginia, West Virginia and North Carolina during 2002 (51) . In addition, turkeys were more susceptible than chickens to infection by wild-bird LPAI viruses (49) . Vaccinating turkeys increases their resistance
Rev. sci. tech. Off. int. Epiz., 30 (3) 855 to LPNAI virus infection: a vaccinated turkey requires at least 2log 10 greater exposure to the virus than a nonvaccinated turkey (5) . According to the survey, on a national poultry population basis, only 2.71% of the poultry in Italy were vaccinated. However, when examining specific types of poultry, peak vaccine usage was in 2003, when meat turkeys had a coverage rate of 84%, layers 23% and meat chickens 0.23% (Table VII) (Table VII) . Italy also developed and implemented a heterologous neuraminidase AI vaccine to allow differentiation of infected poultry in the vaccinated population, i.e. 'differentiation of infected from vaccinated animals' (DIVA) (6) .
Since 1978, the USA has used targeted vaccination in Minnesota turkeys against various subtypes of LPAI viruses, including some H5 and H7 LPNAI epizootics (25) . From 1979 to 2000, 22.7 million doses of LPAI vaccine were used to control 108 epizootics, of which 20 were due to H5 or H7 subtypes (24) . Over time, as the industry learned the limitations of vaccination and as rearing moved from outdoors to indoors by 1998, AI vaccine use declined to minimal then to no use (25) . (Table VII) . However, since the vaccination was targeted at a single, large, layer company in Connecticut, the coverage rate was actually 56% of the state' s chicken inventory. Based on global usage, this was 0.08% of the vaccine used for LPNAI between 2002 and 2010. The programme used two different DIVA strategies: -virological testing of mortality cases from nonvaccinated sentinel and vaccinated layers -serology in non-vaccinated sentinel birds (52) .
A similar targeted vaccination programme was used in 1995 in a single turkey production company in the Moroni Valley, Utah (17) . The programme used two million doses of inactivated H7N3 vaccine over a four-month period.
Portugal experienced an outbreak of H5N2 LPNAI in a single game-bird holding of mallard ducks (Anas platyrhynchus) during September 2007, controlling it through depopulation of infected, outdoor-reared ducks. The unique genetics of the mallard strain were preserved through vaccinating the indoor-reared breeder ducks and monitoring for infection in non-vaccinated sentinel ducks. The progeny were not vaccinated, and were used for restocking wild game populations.
H5 and H7 AI vaccines have not been used in zoological or other collections of non-poultry birds to protect against LPNAI viruses. The lack of morbidity and mortality from infections by LPNAI viruses in non-poultry species makes the benefit of any vaccination questionable.
Vaccination protocols
Fourteen countries provided the vaccination protocols used in their campaigns. For the most part, two vaccinations were used across all poultry types, including meat ducks and geese, but three vaccinations were typical for chicken and duck layers and breeders, with semiannual or yearly boosters. One country used four vaccinations in chicken layers and breeders before 20 weeks of age. Some countries vaccinated broilers with their first vaccination at seven to ten days and a booster at three to four weeks. However, two countries used only a single vaccination in broilers. One country used three vaccinations in ducks, turkeys, guinea fowl and larger poultry.
Post-vaccination strategies
Thirteen countries conducted post-vaccination surveillance, by serological assay, to assess field protection. The most common test was the HI test, using a minimum protective titre of 1:16 (in five countries), 1:32 (in one country), 1:64 (in one country) and 1:128 (in two countries). Two countries used the enzymelinked immunosorbent assay to determine immunity status. 
Identification of infected birds in vaccinated populations
Thirty countries responded to the question about identifying infected birds within a vaccinated population. Sixteen of these countries (53%) had a strategy to distinguish infected birds from vaccinated birds (i.e. a DIVA strategy). Fourteen of these 16 countries (88%) used non-vaccinated sentinels and clinical observation (14%), virological testing (50%) and/or serological testing (79%), ranging from every two weeks to four times per year. Seven (50%) countries employed heterologous neuraminidase vaccines and serological testing for anti-neuraminidase antibodies against the field virus in vaccinated birds, using a neuraminidase inhibition test or immunological detection of anti-neuraminidase antibody. Thirteen (93%) conducted examinations for the field virus in vaccinated birds by virus isolation (33%) and/or detection of the H5 or H7 genome (67%), through real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction assay. -The majority of countries had an option for AI vaccination in their HPAI control plans, but fewer countries had an AI vaccination option in their H5 and H7 LPNAI control plans.
Vaccine licensing and registration
-Over half of the countries had written vaccination plans, but only a small number had completed simulation exercises or worked out the logistics of implementing a vaccination programme and/or an exit strategy.
-One-third of the countries had used vaccines for HPAI control, while only one-sixth had used vaccines to control H5 and H7 LPNAI or non-H5/H7 LPAI (mainly H9N2 LPAI).
-To provide vaccine for emergency use, only 13 countries had developed H5 and/or H7 national AI vaccine banks, with eight countries receiving help from donors through international and national donor organisations.
-The most common reasons for not using AI vaccines included:
i) traditional control measures, including stamping out, were effective in eradication campaigns ii) AI vaccines and vaccination were perceived to have certain negative consequences, such as the potential for silent infections and subclinical shedding of AI virus, and the imposition of trade restrictions on poultry products by importing countries.
-The most common reasons for using AI vaccines included:
i) traditional control methods failed to control or eradicate the infection ii) the outbreaks were large with a high risk of spread iii) AI vaccination was perceived to have certain positive consequences, such as a decrease in susceptibility to infection, a decrease in virus shedding and the prevention of clinical disease and mortality.
-The majority of countries used AI vaccine as an emergency measure, with half of these using AI vaccine as preventive or routine measure.
-More than 113 billion doses of AI vaccine were used in the at-risk poultry population of >131 billion birds in 15 countries, to protect against HPAI, from 2002 to 2010.
-Most countries did not achieve a 100% AI vaccine coverage rate in their poultry population because of the limited availability of the vaccine and the complex logistics of vaccination, especially in countries with large poultry populations in the village/household and small farm sectors. This suggests that a more targeted vaccination approach would be more realistic and successful.
-The majority of AI vaccine was used in four countries with enzootic H5N1 HPAI virus infections and mass vaccination programmes: China (90.99%), Egypt (4.65%), Indonesia (2.32%) and Vietnam (1.43%). The remaining 11 countries used a more targeted vaccination approach with minimal usage; i.e. accounting for less than 1% of the total AI vaccine use.
-More countries used AI vaccine in non-poultry birds in zoos and other collections than in poultry species, but the overall number of doses used in non-poultry species was very low, representing less than 0.000003% of the total.
-Employing the AI vaccine did not lead to enzootic HPAI virus infections, since: -The most consistent vaccination protocols used two vaccinations for meat birds and three to four vaccinations for breeder and layer birds. The use of a single vaccination for short-lived broilers and meat ducks did not provide consistent immunity and protection, especially in the presence of maternal antibodies.
-The HI test was most commonly used for field assessment of post-vaccination immunity, with the minimum protective titre being 1:16 to 1:128.
-Infected birds in the vaccinated population were identified using a variety of test methods, including:
i) clinical, serological and virological assessment of nonvaccinated sentinels (88%)
ii) heterologous neuraminidase vaccines and serological testing for anti-neuraminidase antibodies against the field virus in vaccinated birds (50%)
iii) examination of vaccinated birds for the field virus (80%). iii) as a routine measure when enzootic infection exists.
-Emergency AI vaccination programmes need advanced planning, plans and logistics should be practised in the field, and vaccine banks should be developed and used effectively.
-Preventive AI vaccination can be improved with advanced planning, but is not as time-sensitive as emergency AI vaccination programmes.
-Routine AI vaccination programmes can be used to maintain rural livelihoods and food security, and to reduce human exposure and infections, but they are logistically difficult to implement, unlikely to successfully vaccinate all poultry, and expensive to sustain, with low potential for effective HPAI elimination.
-AI vaccines can be used in preventive or emergency programmes to protect zoo birds, endangered species and other valuable, non-poultry species to maintain biodiversity, and such vaccine use should not prevent trade in poultry and poultry products.
-All vaccination programmes should include statistically valid, post-vaccination immunity studies at the flock and within-flock levels to assess the success of the programme.
-As the AI outbreak matures, and epidemiological data become available, routine vaccination programmes should be updated to become risk-based, with resources being focused on the populations and reservoirs at highest risk.
-An exit strategy is crucial in any country using AI vaccination and should be developed based on specific field conditions, while resources should be redirected to high-risk conditions/populations, with a risk-based, phaseout strategy.
-There is no one AI control solution for all countries; each AI strategy must be specific to the country and production sectors concerned. Resumen Desde 1959 ha habido veintinueve epizootias distintas de influenza aviar altamente patógena (IAAP). La mayor de todas ellas fue la panzootia por el virus H5N1 que golpeó Asia, África y Europa Oriental y afectó a la población avícola de corral o salvaje de 63 países. La aplicación de programas de sacrificio sanitario se saldó con la erradicación de 24 de esas epizootias (y está cerca de llevar a idéntico desenlace la epizootia por el virus H5N2 que afecta actualmente a avestruces en Sudáfrica), pero en cuatro casos en que esa política no resultaba por sí sola lo bastante eficaz se practicaron vacunaciones para completar los programas de lucha. Entre 2002 y 2010 se administraron más de 113.000 millones de dosis de vacuna contra la influenza aviar (IA), para una población de aves de corral en situación de riesgo que, en el conjunto de los países, suponía en total más de 131.000 millones de ejemplares. A razón de dos o tres dosis por ejemplar en los 15 países vacunadores, la tasa de cobertura nacional de vacunación fue en promedio del 41,9% y la de cobertura mundial del 10,9% de toda la población de aves de corral. Los índices más elevados de cobertura nacional, de casi un 100%, se dieron en Hong Kong, y los más bajos, de alrededor del 0,01%, en Israel y los Países Bajos. De todas las vacunas contra la IA administradas, un 95,5% fueron vacunas inactivadas, y un 4,5% vacunas vivas de virus recombinantes. La mayoría de ellas se utilizaron durante la panzootia de IAAP por H5N1, concentradas, en más del 99%, en la República Popular de China, Egipto, Indonesia y Vietnam. En estos cuatro países se instituyó la vacunación después de que la IAAP por H5N1 cobrara carácter enzoótico en las aves domésticas, y la vacunación no resultó en infecciones enzoóticas. El uso de vacunas previno la infección clínica y mortalidad de pollos y en las zonas rurales protegió los medios de subsistencia y la seguridad alimentaria durante los brotes de IAAP. En 2006 la Organización Mundial de Sanidad Animal (OIE) decidió imponer la obligatoriedad de notificar la influenza aviar levemente patógena (IALP) porque ciertos virus H5 y H7 causantes de esa afección tenían la capacidad de mutar y provocar la IAAP. Se han comunicado menos brotes de IALP que de IAAP, y solamente seis países han recurrido a vacunaciones como parte de los programas de lucha, lo que significa que un 8,1% del total de vacunas fueron utilizadas contra las cepas H5 o H7, en comparación con un porcentaje de más del 91,9% de vacunas empleadas contra la IAAP. Hay seis países que han recurrido a la vacuna para controlar la IALP de declaración obligatoria, pero el grueso de las vacunaciones se ha concentrado en México, Guatemala, El Salvador e Italia. En países donde había IAAP y IALP de declaración obligatoria de carácter enzoótico, la elaboración y aplicación de estrategias de salida ha sido un proceso difícil.
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